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ABSTRACT  
 
Kosovo has been under various forms of international administration since 1999. 
Although the political dimension of this international experience has been widely studied 
by scholars — especially those associated with the critical theory of liberal peacebuilding 
— the economic dimension of international rule has received less attention. This article 
explores the economic dimension by linking insights from rentier theory with critical 
approaches to liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding. The postulate informing this article 
is that the sources of a state’s income have an impact on its institutional development. The 
article discusses liberal peacebuilding through the lens of rentier theory, it analyses the 
economic management in the early years of the international administration of Kosovo, 
and describes and explores some of the unintended consequences of this massive 
international presence in Kosovo for the local economy.  
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An earlier version of this article was presented at the international conference ‘Economic Development 
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Curie Actions (FP7). We are also grateful to Muhammad Badiuzzaman for research assistance. 
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The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)1 has been entrusted 
with the difficult task of administering the war-torn territory of Kosovo following the 1999 
conflict, which saw more than 10,000 casualties attributed to Serbian military or paramilitary 
forces in Kosovo. Meanwhile, more than 1.5 million Kosovar Albanians were either forcibly 
expelled from their homes or decided to flee the conflict, representing some 90 per cent of the 
estimated Kosovar Albanian population in 1998. The level of infrastructural and institutional 
destruction in Kosovo added to the political wrangling over the final status of the territory and 
continuing inter-community tensions, and provided the United Nations and leading Western 
governments with a perfect legitimate excuse to preclude any immediate transfer of authority to 
indigenous authorities and to authorize an international administration that would regulate all 
aspects of the everyday life of Kosovars (Lemay-Hébert, 2011b, 2012). Hence, the Security 
Council mandated UNMIK to administer ‘temporarily’ the territory of Kosovo, in the process 
conferring on the UN administration executive, legislative and judicial powers over the territory. 
More than sixteen years after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1244 establishing 
UNMIK, the UN is still de jure administrating Kosovo, even if it jump-started the process of 
handover to local institutions in 2004 and the European Union has taken over most of the 
supervisory responsibilities since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008. 
 
Despite being welcomed wholeheartedly by the local population in the immediate aftermath of 
the conflict, the relationship between UNMIK and Kosovars quickly soured. In fact, from the first 
Early Warning reports (conducted in 2002 by USAID and UNDP) to the present day, UNMIK 
has been one of the most unpopular political institutions in Kosovo, with the exception of the 
winter of 2006, when the provisional institutions of self-government (PISG) were held 
1 UNMIK is divided into four pillars, each originally headed by a different international organization with 
specific roles and responsibilities (UN, 1999). Through doing so, the UN Secretariat hoped to increase the 
international organizations’ interoperability on the ground, one of the reported deficiencies of previous 
peacebuilding missions, notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dizdarević, 2004: 39). The first pillar was 
dedicated to humanitarian action under the aegis of the UNHCR until June 2000. At the end of what came 
to be called the ‘emergency stage,’ a new Pillar I was established to cover the realm of ‘police and 
justice,’ and then passed to the UN itself. The civil administration component of the mission constitutes 
the second pillar and is directly under the leadership of the UN. Pillar III is the vaguely termed 
‘democratization and institution building’, led by the OSCE. Finally, the European Union has charge of 
the ‘reconstruction and economic development’ pillar. The other international organizations involved in 
the reconstruction and administration of Kosovo, such as WFP, UNICEF, WHO, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, work under the coordination of the lead agency for each pillar, and under 
the general coordination of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). 
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responsible for a delay in negotiations.2 In other words, UNMIK fundamentally lost the struggle 
for hearts and minds in Kosovo. In the words of Anthony Welch, Coordinator of the International 
Security Sector Review for Kosovo, UNMIK simply ‘failed to command the respect of the local 
population’ (Welch, 2006: 225; see also ICG, 1999). After 2004, the level of satisfaction with 
UNMIK action was so low that, as King and Mason who had worked for UNMIK remarked: ‘If 
UNMIK had been up for election, it would have needed to campaign hard to win votes from 
anybody in Kosovo other than its own staff’ (2006: 220). The Secretary-General subsequently 
dispatched a Norwegian diplomat, Ambassador Kai Eide, to conduct a comprehensive review of 
the policies and practices of all actors in Kosovo. The conclusion of the first Eide report was 
clear: there should be an ambitious policy of transfer of authority to the institutions of Kosovo, 
coupled with a restructuring of UNMIK (UN, 2004: 3–5). As Ambassador Eide further noted in a 
second report, ‘while standards implementation in Kosovo has been uneven, the time has come to 
move to the next phase of the political process’ (UN, 2005). Hence, it was clear that ‘after 
administering Kosovo for six years and four months, the UN accepted that its usefulness had 
come to an end’ (King and Mason, 2006: vii). Martti Ahtisaari, appointed Special Envoy of the 
Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status, built extensively on Eide’s assessment and in 2007, 
after fruitless negotiations between Serbian and Kosovar representatives, recommended 
‘independence, supervised by the international community’ for Kosovo (UN, 2007). Hence, as 
Tim Judah states, ‘the years of the UN protectorate looked as though they were giving way to 
those of something new: an EU protectorate, at least in those areas where Albanians lived’ (2008: 
116). 
 
Several authors have explored the political hurdles of governing Kosovo through an international 
administration (Caplan, 2005; Hehir, 2009; Lemay-Hébert, 2011a, 2013; Narten, 2008; Visoka, 
2011; Yannis, 2004). Most of these analyses fall into the broader framework of the critique of the 
liberal peace paradigm as the dominant form of externally supported peacebuilding (Chandler, 
2006; Cooper, 2007; Duffield, 2007; Joshi et al., 2014; Richmond, 2005). The liberal peace 
paradigm refers here to the idea that certain kinds of society will tend to be more peaceful, both 
in their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than ‘illiberal’ states. Hence, liberal 
2 See the ‘Early Warning’ and ‘Public Pulse’ reports. 
www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/library.html (accessed 10 June 2015) 
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peacebuilding implies not just managing instability between states — the traditional focus of the 
IR discipline — but also within states, on the basis of liberal democracy and market economics 
(Newman et al., 2009: 7). The liberal peace paradigm encompasses socio-cultural norms 
associated with peacemaking, as well as the international and national structures instrumental to 
promoting the liberal peace. Economic considerations are also central to the model, for liberal 
peacebuilding implies ‘the globalisation of a particular model of domestic governance — liberal 
market democracy — from the core to the periphery of the international system’ (Paris, 2002: 
638; see also Duffield, 2001; Pugh et al., 2008). 
 
While keeping in mind the aforementioned legitimacy gap, this article analyses certain oft-
neglected economic themes in the statebuilding and peacebuilding literature, all related to the 
international governance of Kosovo in the first decade following the 1999 war, and hints at an 
alternative research agenda. While there has been much critical debate about liberal 
peacebuilding in the last decade, leading to innovative conceptualizations of the limits of the 
external imposition of political institutions on so-called fragile or weak states (Grimm et al., 
2014), critical scholars have recently been challenged to develop ‘sharper theoretical tools to 
understand and explain the complex empirical cases that are thrown up by the liberal peace’ 
(Heathershaw, 2013: 275; see also Zaum, 2012). This article tries to contribute to this new wave 
of theorization by explicitly drawing from rentier state theory in economics and the impact of 
external inflows, exploring ‘the patterns of development and the nature of states in economies 
dominated by external rent’ (Mahdavy, 1970: 428).3 Hence, Kosovo’s substantial external 
inflows — which amounted to a process of rentier statebuilding4 — have had far-reaching 
consequences for the nascent state, beyond conventional impacts on sovereignty.  
 
We argue that rentier theory can shed additional light on the travails of liberal peacebuilding and 
statebuilding in Kosovo, especially by linking Kosovo’s sources of income with the state’s 
institutional development, and by providing additional insights into the complex relationship 
between the United Nations and Kosovars. Three main themes are specifically addressed in this 
article. First, it explores the specific linkages between the critical approach to liberal 
3 Substantial external inflows can also include worker remittances from abroad — something that is not 
strictly ‘rent’, but can have similar consequences, as discussed below. 
4 A concept also developed by Florian Kühn in a presentation (2010). 
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peacebuilding and rentier state theory, further developing the interplay between these two bodies 
of literature through the concept of rentier statebuilding. Second, the article revisits the claim, 
often made by scholars and practitioners, that external structures such as international 
administrations are an efficient means to govern war-torn territories on a temporary basis (see 
Lemay-Hébert, 2015). Without engaging in the debate surrounding the corruption of international 
officials5 — which can be enlightening when discussing culturalist claims that the ‘culture of 
Kosovo’ impedes any significant changes in the region (Aitala, 2008; Cilluffo and Salmoiraghi, 
1999)6 — this article looks at the limits of economic management ‘from the outside-in’ (Lemay-
Hébert, 2009b). It revisits Kosovo’s economic growth data in the post-war years, and looks at the 
difficulties we face in assessing Kosovo’s post-war economic growth. Finally, the article analyses 
the impact of international transfers on the local economy through the specific lens of the rentier 
state and the ‘Dutch disease’ theory, shedding additional light on the complex interplay between 
the economic and political dimensions of international statebuilding.  
 
 
LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING AND THE RENTIER STATE 
 
It is now generally accepted that contemporary attempts at statebuilding avowedly or 
inadvertently deploy policies akin to the ‘liberal peace’ paradigm (see Joshi et al., 2014). Despite 
this generally held idea, here the liberal peace paradigm is not so much associated with classical 
liberal thinking — which is a heterogeneous and diverse school of thought scholarship — but 
5 The most serious cases of misconduct in Kosovo were: the embezzlement of € 3.9 million of Kosovo 
Energy Corporation (KEK) funds by Joe Trutschler, a senior German official, and € 300,000 by Kosovo 
Trust Agency (KTA) Division Manager, Roger Reynolds; and allegations of corruption by Gerard Fischer, 
who was the Deputy SRSG and signed a contract involving Post and Telecom Kosovo (PTK) without 
going through procurement procedures. Mr Fischer has been arrested but has not faced trial, and has 
accepted another assignment. Recently, an internal report was leaked, revealing that the European Union 
and United Nations have abandoned investigations into serious allegations of fraud and corruption over 
£ 60 million-worth of funding for Kosovo. According to this report, EU funds for economic reconstruction 
to help rebuild a war-shattered Kosovo ten years ago were hit by at least eleven scandals involving twelve 
cases of alleged criminal activity and twenty-seven examples of alleged breaches of rules on the award of 
contracts and nepotism (Buzhala 2006; Waterfield 2009; Zaremba 2007b).  
6 For a non-ideological and culturally sensitive take on Kosovo’s ‘shadow economy’, see the work of 
Michael Pugh (2004).  
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viewed instead as having closer links with democratic peace theory in international relations.7 
Democratic peace theory posits the absence of major armed conflict between economically 
interdependent and democratic nations who share membership of common international 
organizations (Gleditsch, 2008). The central mechanism behind the theory is that states that share 
common values, and/or are mutually interdependent, eschew the strategy of war to settle their 
differences. Different strands of the democratic peace theory have emerged over time, each 
having an impact on the liberal peace debate. They include studies on the obsolescence of major 
wars following a normative evolution of mental habits (Mueller, 1988), institutional perspectives, 
studying the impact of international institutions on the behaviour of states (Russett and Oneal, 
2001), and economic theses based on cost–benefit analyses of conflict (Oneal and Russett, 1999). 
The liberal peacebuilding paradigm is then inspired by these discussions, and in a sense furthers 
the research agenda to extend it to societal cohesion inside state units. Hence, liberal 
peacebuilding implies not just managing instability between states — which is the central focus 
of the democratic peace theory — but also building peace within states on the basis of liberal 
democracy and market economics. Mirroring the democratic peace debate, the liberal peace 
paradigm encompasses socio-cultural norms associated with peacemaking, as well as the 
international and national structures instrumental to promoting the liberal peace paradigm. Both 
democratic peace theory and the liberal peacebuilding discussion are thus built on two main 
assumptions, presented in the literature as inseparable: an economic assumption — economic 
interdependence and exchange reduces the propensity to wage war; and a normative assumption 
— institutions or increased interactions will lead to a growing sense of a common polity and 
values (following a Kantian or Rawlsian approach). This article unearths these assumptions 
embedded in the liberal peace discussions and analyses them in light of the literature on the 
rentier state in Kosovo. 
 
The economic and normative assumptions that trade between nations directly contributes to 
peace within and between societies actually have deep roots, which can be traced back to certain 
segments of the traditional liberal scholarship including, for instance, Baron de Montesquieu’s 
The Spirit of the Laws (1748), where he argues that commerce tends to promote peace between 
7 Which renders the whole argument of how ‘liberal’ the liberal peace paradigm is rather moot. For 
proponents of this argument, see Selby (2013).  
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nations, mutual self-interest precludes war, and trade softens attitudes of peoples towards each 
other; or in Richard Cobden’s declaration that ‘commerce is the grand panacea’ (1835), by 
which he meant the pacific and civilizing effects of international trade, along with its potential 
for assuaging tensions between nations (see also Paine, 1791–2: 265; or, for a more recent 
iteration of these principles, Angell, 1910). Democratic peace theory was clearly inspired by 
these discussions, and developed its own statistical models to verify these claims. Hegre (2000) 
argued that economic interdependence reinforces peace, but mainly between more developed 
economies, while Russett and Oneal (2001) asserted that it is the economic dependence on trade 
of the least dependent on the other members of a group of nations that will determine the pacific 
effect of trade. Among the most recent updates proposed for democratic peace theory is the 
‘capitalist’ peace notion of Gartzke (2007), which goes beyond trade dependence. He argues 
that the intensity of trade is the least important feature in the peace engendered by capitalism; in 
fact, the nature of advanced capitalism makes territorial disputes — which are mainly contests 
over resources — less likely as the market mechanism allows easier access to resources. The 
nature of capitalist production makes the output of more sophisticated goods and services 
increasingly reliant on ideas or blueprints that are research and development oriented rather than 
resource intensive, and skilled personnel can be acquired through more open global labour 
markets. Moreover, financial interdependence makes war between those integrated in this 
manner even more costly compared to trade disruptions. 
 
While building (consciously or unconsciously) on this scholarship, liberal peacebuilding shifts 
the focus from interstate collaboration to intrastate cohesion. Hence, here the liberal peace 
paradigm refers to the idea that certain kinds of society will tend to be more peaceful in their 
domestic dispute resolution compared to ‘illiberal’ states. Economic stagnation, or economic 
development that is very unevenly distributed, can cause the tolerant niceties of an existing 
domestic social contract to fray. Those left behind and the underprivileged may revolt if 
coherently organized and if opportunities present themselves, which can lead to internal 
conflicts and violence. Equally, the relatively rich may choose to prey on the less fortunate if 
they are no longer prepared to subsidize or support these groups. It is important to note that so-
called liberal democracies are not immune from these tendencies; recent history has shown that 
they can very well behave violently towards segments of their societies. Indeed, as has been 
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argued, since 1991 developing countries are mostly characterized by imperfect democracies or 
anocracies8 containing elements of democracy (multi-party electoral competition) along with 
some of the more invidious traits of autocracy (no effective checks on the executive, for 
example). Ultimately, as the argument goes, growth and increased economic interaction through 
globalization, as well as rising democratization, are likely to promote peace between and within 
developing countries, mirroring Lipset’s (1960) modernization hypothesis that democracy (and 
peace) inevitably follow economic growth.9 
 
Proponents of liberal statebuilding aim to follow a path similar to that described by Auty and 
Gelb (2001) as ‘benevolent and developmental’, by which they mean that the state actively 
promotes an internationally competitive economy, discouraging in the process rent-seeking 
behaviour. This path, however, is directly challenged when the elite composition of the state 
and the nature of the economy have characteristics and tendencies that turn the state into a 
rentier or predatory one.10 A rentier state derives a substantial portion of its income from non-
produced sources (Omeje, 2008: 5), and is largely dependent on these external rents and 
inflows. By ‘non-produced income’, we refer to categories of income such as official 
development assistance and worker remittances from abroad that augment national income but 
are not part of domestically produced output. Worker remittances from abroad are not strictly 
‘rent’, but can have similar negative consequences on domestic production by providing 
alternative sources of income based on external inflows. We may add the windfall or Ricardian 
quasi-rent (shortage value) of unusually high natural resource-related royalties (usually oil) 
during commodity price booms. Thus, ‘rents’ can originate from various sources: natural 
resources (in petro-monarchies, for instance), contrived rent or political manipulation of prices 
(Zimbabwe recently), or foreign aid, also dubbed ‘geopolitical rent’ by Richard Auty (2006: 
37).11 This geopolitical rent can reach 10 to 25 per cent of GDP in developing countries, 
8 See, for instance, the Polity IV project for combined democracy and autocracy scores. 
www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm  
9 The economic objective of a competitive international economy may be retarded by external constraints 
to economic growth (see Chang, 2003). 
10 See Verkoren and Kamphuis (2013) for an elaboration on these concepts, with an application to the case 
of Afghanistan.  
11 If rents can come from various sources, they don’t have equal effects. Paul Collier argues that ‘despite 
the bureaucracy, aid has been much more successful than oil’, even if this is a disputed assertion in 
development economics (Collier, 2008: 102).  
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according to figures compiled by Peter Boone (1996). As we shall see below, total external 
inflows in post-war Kosovo have been up to 35 per cent of GDP. One of the principal 
consequences of rents is the distortions induced on actors’ behaviour, in other words the rent-
seeking behaviour of economic agents. 
 
The ideal-typical rentier state is therefore usually associated with weak public institutions, 
political instability, inequitable wealth distribution,12 and high levels of corruption, as well as 
resource inflows from abroad (Woolcock et al., 2001: 76). This configuration impacts not only 
the local economy, but also the nature of state–society relations and institutions.13 External 
resources can drive a certain type of exogenous growth, but this comes with a vulnerability to 
external shocks — for instance, the progressive drawdown of international transfers. In a rentier 
state context, national income contains a substantial proportion of non-produced elements: 
natural resource revenues or royalties (which are chiefly a gift of nature); foreign aid (in the 
main, a transfer of resources); and remittances sent by nationals working abroad (whose value 
added is to a foreign economy). All three elements can seriously ‘distort’ the structure and 
future growth trajectory of the economy, via a phenomenon known as the Dutch disease (see 
Murshed, 2010). The Dutch disease encompasses a variety of negative impacts on an economy, 
giving rise to a sharp inflow of foreign currency. It describes situations in which consumption 
relative to investment is encouraged, where production is skewed away from traded goods 
(agriculture or manufacturing) towards services,14 and in which exports are rendered 
uncompetitive. The original Dutch disease is traditionally linked to the real appreciation of a 
national currency in a context of resource wealth, which undermines the competitiveness of all 
produced economic activities (i.e. excluding services)  (Dauderstädt, 2006: 16). Dutch disease 
effects may also emanate from substantial external assistance or worker remittances from 
abroad. The term was coined by The Economist in 1977 to describe the adverse impact of a 
North Sea gas bonanza on the economy of the Netherlands, and in this context it involves 
12 The inequality in both income and wealth has been rising in the richer Western economies also, see 
Piketty (2014) for example. An argument can be made that these inequalities are in part due to the 
phenomenon of rent rather than a return to capital.  
13 This is a configuration also analysed in the literature on neo-patrimonialism, looking at personalistic and 
clientelistic governance systems marked by high levels of rent-seeking, corruption, waste, 
authoritarianism, arbitrariness and political instability (Kelsall et al., 2010 and references therein). 
14 A high share of services in the national income may be characteristic of a mature manufacturing 
economy. Here we refer to a high share of services as a result of windfall external inflows. 
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commodity exports driving up the value of the currency, making other parts of the economy less 
competitive, leading to a current-account surplus and even greater dependence on natural-
resource exports. Later on, the economic theory of the Dutch disease focused on the negative 
impact of resource booms and external inflows on the long-term growth prospects of the 
economy (Murshed, 2010).  
 
Worker remittances from abroad account for a substantial portion of Kosovo’s GDP, as 
indicated in Table 1. Remittances from abroad are not strictly speaking a rent, unlike aid or 
certain types of natural resource-based royalties. Yet they have been argued to reduce long-term 
growth in a cross-country econometric study by Barajas et al. (2009). Worker remittances do 
contribute to consumption smoothing, and help reduce poverty in poorer countries, but they can 
stem labour supply and prevent savings from being channelled into productive investment in 
countries with poor institutional settings. Moreover, remittances also cause real exchange rate 
appreciation, but it may be weaker than in the case of resource rents (Ratha, 2013). Ratha also 
argues that remittances may encourage private expenditure on health and education, besides 
helping to reduce poverty in poor countries. Driffield and Jones (2013) have found that 
remittances may promote long-term economic growth in a context where the quality of 
institutions is good, particularly law and order (property rights and contract enforcement). 
Hence, the presence or absence of negative Dutch disease-type effects of substantial remittance 
inflows may depend on the quality of institutions related to the political economy. The cross-
country econometric study conducted by Abdih et al. (2008) suggests that remittances have a 
negative impact on institutional quality, as they are often accompanied by governments 
siphoning money away for their own purposes, leading to a weakening of institutional quality 
due to corruption and a decline in government effectiveness and the rule of law. Scholars have 
also questioned the sustainability of the Kosovar economic model’s heavy reliance on 
remittances (Korovilas, 2010) — even if it has probably helped mitigate the impact of the 
global financial crisis of 2008 (Pula, 2014), especially in keeping consumption poverty down. 
 
According to Michael Dauderstädt, one of the negative political-economy effects of the Dutch 
disease can be that ‘the government is not really interested in developing the national economy 
as a tax base because of the availability of rents’ (2006: 16). By contrast, low rents are more 
10 
 
likely to motivate governments to create wealth as the most practical means of boosting output, 
which can then be taxed to increase revenue (Auty, 2006: 38). In other words, low rents could 
align the incentives of the elite with those of the majority in growing the economy by providing 
public goods and efficiency incentives, whereas high rents incentivize the elite to pursue 
immediate self-enrichment by channelling rent through patronage networks at the expense of 
markets, which distorts the economy (Auty, 2010). 
 
In many ways, the ‘rentier state’ theory is the political economy counterpart of the purely 
economic Dutch disease theory, emphasizing the role of institutions (or governance) in 
promoting or retarding economic progress (see Mavrotas et al., 2011; Mehlum et al., 2006). In 
this sense, both the rentier state and the Dutch disease theories provide a counterpoint to the two 
classical assumptions of the democratic peace theory and the liberal peacebuilding paradigm 
(normative and economic, as discussed earlier). In this literature, abundant resource rents only 
constitute a problem for the economy if economic and political institutions are weak, leading to 
poor governance and corruption. Furthermore, in the context of economies characterized by an 
abundance of natural resource rents, the combination of Dutch disease and a rentier economy 
contributes to what has been dubbed the ‘resource curse’: economic stagnation and political 
discontent in the midst of plentiful resource rents which are subjected to elite capture. A 
predatory state goes one step further (Verkoren and Kamphuis, 2013: 509–11): here, the elite’s 
interest in rent extraction renders them comparable to the roving bandits described by Olson 
(1996). A roving bandit merely exacts tribute, without nurturing the tax base from which the 
rent is exacted, effectively destroying the economy. By contrast, a stationary bandit attempts to 
expand the very same base by promoting growth, although he is still interested in exacting 
tribute. The appearance of a high volume of resource rents and substantial quantities of overseas 
aid can encourage predation. Rentier or predatory states invalidate most of the liberal 
peacebuilding postulates, since the structure of rentier economies has an adverse impact on the 
political and economic institutions necessary for sustaining democratization and a competitive 
economy, which run counter to the interests of elites in a rentier state, and more so in an even 
more extractive, kleptocratic predatory state.         
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Hence, we suggest the concept of rentier statebuilding to encapsulate these socio-economic 
dynamics. We concur with Barnett Rubin’s statement that there are definite ‘similarities between 
rentier states based on natural resource extraction and states being built through third-party aid in 
international operations’ (2006: 30–1). A large international presence can disrupt market 
efficiency and have unintended consequences for the social contract binding the government and 
its population. The large international presence creates negative externalities — defined as a 
situation in which an individual or firm (in this context, the peacebuilding operation) makes a 
decision, but does not bear the full cost of the decision, leading to market inefficiencies. 
Furthermore, while external aid is vital to reconstruction and development efforts in post-conflict 
economies characterized by the paucity of private sources of finance, aid dependence may retard 
the development of state capacity and the development of the national economy as a tax base, as 
described in Ghani and Lockhart in the case of Afghanistan (2008; see also Kühn, 2008; Rubin, 
1992; Verkoren and Kamphuis, 2013).   
 
 
BREAKING THE SPIN: REASSESING KOSOVO’S GROWTH UNDER UNMIK 
 
Before addressing the specific nature of the rentier economy in Kosovo and rentier statebuilding 
processes, it is useful to stress the contested nature of the local economy, which led in turn to a 
very political process of the production of statistics in order to bolster the rationale for supporting 
liberal peacebuilding in the region.15 Liberal peacebuilding was clearly one of the cornerstones of 
the international intervention in Kosovo (Pugh, 2005: 26; Knudsen, 2013), but the consequences 
of the international policies did not follow the liberal peacebuilding model and instead led to 
dynamics more akin to rentierism. 
 
In Kosovo, economic policies were determined and implemented directly by international 
officials, at least until the creation of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) in 
2001. One of the local complaints addressed to UNMIK in the early years was about the pace of 
recovery in Kosovo, which had been too slow to meet people’s demands and expectations, and 
15 For a discussion on the politicized nature of statistical production in the ‘fragile states’ context, see Rocha de 
Siquiera (2014). 
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which led in turn to growing discontent. This statement directly conflicts with the commonly held 
narrative that international actors are better managers than locals and more to be trusted in a 
context of widespread corruption. As was made clear by UN Assistant Secretary-General and 
Associate Administrator of the UN Development Programme, Ad Melkert, Kosovo was an utter 
shambles immediately before its declaration of independence in February 2008. After a visit to 
Kosovo in 2007, Melkert recognized that ‘the situation in Kosovo can be compared to the 
circumstances in the poorest African countries: an extremely high mortality rate of newborn 
children (35 deaths to 1,000 births), a very high unemployment rate (42 per cent), a poor 
educational system and a severely polluted environment’ (Melkert, 2007). Similarly, for  
UNICEF, Kosovo was ‘an island of poverty in Europe’ in 2008 (2008: 11). 
 
However, official statistics appeared to show impressive GDP growth in Kosovo, especially in 
the aftermath of the international intervention of 1999, thus strengthening the legitimacy of the 
liberal peacebuilding policies. For instance, economic growth was estimated at 11 per cent in 
2001 and 7 per cent in 2002. On the eve of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, it was widely 
accepted that Kosovo’s estimated GDP had grown by at least a factor of two over the nine-year 
period. However, the key word here is ‘estimated’. Indeed, official estimates of the size of 
Kosovo’s GDP have been continuously revised downwards. In December 2001, the IMF 
estimated it at € 1.85 billion, while in June 2003 it put it at € 1.57 billion and, in December 2003, 
UNMIK estimated it at € 1.34 billion (IMF and UNMIK numbers, quoted in Economic Strategy 
and Project Identification Group, 2004: 7). As ESPIG notes: ‘This shows a disturbing lack of any 
reliable statistical base for evaluating the level of activity in Kosovo upon which growth figures 
could be calculated. It also reveals a growing sense of unease among international officials about 
the nature of the post-war economy’ (2004: 7). An explanatory note in IMF documents states that 
‘all data for Kosovo are estimates’ (see, for instance, IMF, 2007). The IMF also clarified that 
‘estimates of the size of the economy of Kosovo are based on partial information, potentially 
unreliable observations, and some educated guesswork’ (Corker et al., 2001: 23). Similarly, 
USAID noted that it had to rely on ‘a professional’s opinion or conventional wisdom’ in some of 
its reports, specifying that ‘in many cases, [they] were unable to separate fact from opinion’ 
(2005: 1). As the economist Ibrahim Rexhepi states, one has to be very cautious with the so-
called economic growth of Kosovo: ‘As far as Kosovo is concerned, just one fact cannot be put in 
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doubt at the moment: its area equals 10,887 square kilometres. All other data, including those 
concerning the present state of the economy, are not only utterly unreliable, but for the most part 
unknown’ (quoted in European Centre for Minority Issues). For the KIPRED institute, a local 
think-tank, reliable information is ‘Kosovo’s scarcest resource’ (Muharremi et al., 2003: 40), 
while for Gerald Knaus of the European Stability Initiative, ‘public institutions [in the European 
protectorates] are operating in an information vacuum, cut off from the social groups they are 
supposed to serve’ (Knaus, 2006: 219). Even if one accepts the international economic data, and 
while keeping in mind that economic data on Kosovo before the conflict were to some extent as 
scant and unreliable as after (del Castillo, 2008: 138), Kosovo is still far from its per capita GDP 
levels of before the economic crisis of the 1980s, and is just a bit stronger than the disastrous 
decade of the 1990s (Moalla-Fretini et al., 2005: 6; Palairet, 2001). 
 
This should be kept in mind when considering in retrospect the triumphant press releases of the 
early years of the international administration. This reflects what a former UNMIK official 
termed the mission’s greatest flaw: its propensity to ‘spin information to make it appear that the 
situation in Kosovo is “under control” when this is not the case’ (O’Neill, 2002: 108; see also 
Hehir, 2007: 137). In fact, the UN in Kosovo has gone further than simply spinning the story; a 
confidential study conducted for the German government by the Institute for European Politics 
and leaked to the media accuses NATO and the UN of creating a culture of systematic repression 
of critical reports in order to present Kosovo as a success story (Pancevski, 2007). This 
propensity to silence contradictory voices emerged from the very beginning of the international 
administration in Kosovo.16  
 
In this context, the development challenges of nascent Kosovo were — and to a certain extent 
still are — daunting, despite the aid that flowed into the territory after 1999.17 Economic 
reconstruction was handled principally through two institutions: the European Agency for 
Reconstruction and the EU pillar of UNMIK, as mentioned earlier. The EU clearly took a liberal 
and market-oriented approach towards economic reconstruction, focusing on privatization and 
16 For instance, the UN attempted to shut down a Kosovo Serb radio station on the grounds that it refused 
to air UN messages promoting participation in Kosovar elections. UN sources also mentioned that the 
station was referring to the international presence as an occupying force (Reuters, 2000).  
17 More than € 3.5 billion in international investment has come from international organizations, bilateral 
aid and international NGOs (Skendaj, 2014: 13). 
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fostering a sound economic investment culture for Kosovo. For Andreas Wittkowsky, deputy 
head of the EU pillar, UNMIK was undoubtedly able to put Kosovo’s economy on the right path 
‘by introducing basic modern market institutions and hard budget constraints’ in a context where 
there were ‘clear limits to what an international protectorate can do to enroot these institutions’ 
(Wittkowsky, 2006: 204). It was, therefore, ‘unrealistic to expect that such a protectorate [would] 
leave behind a fully functioning market economy’ (ibid.). As unrealistic as it may seem, 
according to its own former officials UNMIK only managed to forge its strategy in 2003, a fact 
that hindered ‘UNMIK’s ability to forge a viable peace in a reasonable time frame’, which in turn 
contributed to ‘the lack of support for UNMIK by Kosovo’s Serb community and the slow 
erosion of support among the Albanian population’ (Blair et al., 2005: 206). The inability to 
develop an initial reconstruction strategy was compounded by the European Union’s limited 
experience in post-conflict economic reconstruction and difficulty in finding adequate personnel 
for these tasks (Yannis, 2003: 180). 
 
However disputed the economic growth figures under UNMIK, what is certain is that economic 
policies were clearly not pro-poor and developmental, following in that sense the basics of the 
rentier state theory. According to the IMF: ‘The gains achieved so far not only are fragile but 
have left major developmental challenges largely unaddressed. These include entrenched high 
structural unemployment, a depleted stock of human capital, and dilapidated main public utilities 
and infrastructure’ (Moalla-Fretini et al., 2005: 5). It seems important to mention here that, of all 
the problems plaguing Kosovo, unemployment is certainly one of the most acute. As for the 
‘economic growth’ of the early years of international administration, unemployment numbers are 
also difficult to estimate. As the ESPIG (2004: 9) notes, ‘“Unemployment” is an administrative 
category that measures the number of those who are actively looking for work but fail to find it. 
In societies where unemployment status confers benefits, there are clear incentives for people to 
register. In Kosovo, there are no such benefits’. The generally accepted estimate ranges from 30 
to 50 per cent (Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 2010: 5), with an employment rate hovering around 
a desperately low 30 per cent. By contrast, Susan Woodward (1995: 205) puts the unemployment 
rate in pre-war Kosovo at 23.1 per cent in 1985 and estimates it at 22.2 per cent by 1990. 
Moreover, its effects are felt most acutely by children, the elderly, female-headed households and 
ethnic minorities (World Bank, 2005: iii). For King and Mason (2006: 89), the unemployment 
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crisis in Kosovo was linked to the limits of the liberal peace model promoted by the international 
community: people in Kosovo ‘needed more than a free market to find work; they needed 
employers, and these the international community could not create without reverting to socialist 
models’.  
 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSFERS FOR KOSOVO’S ECONOMY: RENTIER 
THEORY AND THE DUTCH DISEASE 
 
Even if we take at face value the statistics produced on Kosovo under the international 
administration, the so-called ‘economic expansion’ of post-war Kosovo described earlier 
depended overwhelmingly on transfers, specifically diaspora remittances and international 
assistance. During 2000–03, foreign assistance amounted to € 4.1 billion, equivalent to over twice 
Kosovo’s 2003 GDP, and private inflows added another € 2.4 billion (Moalla-Fretini et al., 2005: 
5). According to what have been described as ‘very rough estimates’ undertaken by the 
Macroeconomic Policy Unit of the Ministry of Finance and Economy, the estimated total public 
expenditure in 2000 in Kosovo was € 6.3 billion and had fallen to € 3.1 billion in 2003. For the 
ESPIG (2004: 7), ‘the overall implications are clear: GDP growth in Kosovo’s economy was 
driven by external transfers, rather than from any lasting increase in the productivity of Kosovo’s 
enterprises’. Moreover, in 2002, the Ministry of Finance and Economy estimated that, of 
Kosovo’s total income of € 1.57 billion, € 720 million came from cash remittances (Kosovo 
Government, 2003: 8). According to these figures, Kosovar households received more cash 
income from relatives abroad than they did by working in Kosovo. This has helped mitigate 
consumption poverty, as previously indicated. Of course, it is also possible to see the glass half-
full. For Graciana del Castillo (2008: 155), for instance, ‘close to half the regular budget of $ 300 
million for FY [fiscal year] 2000 was financed with domestic revenues’.  
 
While keeping in mind the caveats outlined earlier on the politicized nature of the production of 
statistics in Kosovo, Table 1 below contains macroeconomic data drawn from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators on Kosovo from 2006 onwards and seems to indicate that the 
Kosovar economy has characteristics of both a rentier economy and the Dutch disease. In 2006, 
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for example, the total ‘rent’ from natural resources, aid and remittances reached a staggering 
34.44 per cent of GDP. There is also a huge trade deficit (imports greater than exports), with 
exports comprising mainly base metals rather than agricultural or manufactured goods, and with 
the share of services about two-thirds of the economy, all of which are classic symptoms of 
Dutch disease. Added to that, a recent IMF report (2013) indicates that the tax-to-GDP ratio in 
Kosovo of about 22 per cent was very favourable compared to neighbouring states, but with a 
very high reliance on trade taxes (and very low income tax collection), which will need to be 
relaxed after trade liberalization, making alternative sources of revenue more important. It is also 
important to factor in the adoption of the euro, which makes competitive devaluation impossible, 
despite the low-wage nature of the Kosovar economy. The biggest single factor contributing to 
the Dutch disease is the economy’s major reliance on emigration, and emigrant remittances: one 
in four households had at least one family member residing abroad, and would-be entrants to the 
labour market had an expectation to emigrate (World Bank, 2010).  
 
If the distortions created by the sudden inflow of aid and international workers in Kosovo at the 
height of international intervention in Kosovo (between 1999 and 2004, as discussed in the 
introduction) were considered massive by scholars and practitioners, the absence of reliable 
economic information once again makes it hard to identify rent-seeking practices precisely. Many 
different accounts reflect the same image of post-war Kosovo, with many Kosovars flocking to 
Pristina ‘looking for work or “investment opportunities”’, trebling Pristina’s population in three 
years (King and Mason, 2006: 132). Mark Baskin (2006: 83), who acted as Deputy Regional 
Administrator and Municipal Administrator in Prizren between 1999 and 2000, notes that ‘a 
significant portion of the labour force works for NGOs and international organisations’ (see also 
Perritt, 2004: 276), either by being directly employed by the international institutions or through 
the informal economy generated by their presence. Mr Bajrami, head of the Chamber of 
Commerce, explains for instance that it pays better to sell chewing gum to UN staff than to toil in 
the fields (Zaremba, 2007a), while a cleaning lady working for the UN in Pristina earns three to 
four times more than a government minister (Ammitzboell, 2007: 76–7). A Kosovar judge could 
earn $5,000 a year in 2004 sitting with an international judge earning $140,000 (Villmoare, 2004: 
38). Not only did the employment of local staff by international agencies create a salary disparity 
with other local public and private enterprises — with locals working with the international 
organizations earning four to five times more than their local colleagues who stayed within local 
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institutions (Skendaj 2014: 15) — but it also led to growing tensions between local and 
international staff working for the same organization. Hence, from the very beginning, ‘wages 
paid by the international community as a whole created wage distortions that put serious pressure 
on budgetary decisions’ (del Castillo, 2008: 151). It created a ‘bubble economy’, where the influx 
of thousands of international employees provided a huge boost to the service economy — 
restaurants, bars and bootleg CD sellers (King and Mason, 2006: 131), all consequences of 
external aid inflows and the presence of aid and reconstruction workers.18 The substantially 
different salary scales between internationals and locals were responsible for serious inflationary 
effects, especially on food and the real-estate market (Yannis, 2003: 178). The latter in particular 
suffered — with inflation induced by internationals flooding the territory providing opportunities 
for some, but a housing problem for many (King and Mason, 2006: 132). These major 
developmental challenges were exacerbated by the way international aid was invested. As noted 
by Major General Raul Cunha, Chief Military Liaison Officer of UNMIK, ‘[the] European Union 
has spent in Kosovo € 4,000 million, in different ways. From those 4,000 millions, 80 per cent 
was spent in capacity building and consultancy, which means that 3,200 millions went back to the 
base … that base has been made by two or three countries’ (Cunha, 2008; see also Melkert, 2007; 
World Bank, 2011: 196).  
 
A World Bank report (2010) indicates a number of other constraints on economic growth in 
Kosovo, including energy shortages, a very high skilled-labour premium compared to 
neighbouring countries, and corruption and weak rule of law in relation to widespread rent-
seeking. In this context, the solution according to the World Bank is to do more to attract export-
oriented foreign direct investment. This opinion is supported by the fact that Kosovo’s economy 
has a large and structural trade deficit, which is a classic feature of the Dutch disease (see Table 
1). What is certain is that, with foreign assistance dropping continually, Kosovo is ill-prepared to 
face the challenge of realizing economically sustainable growth. Foreign assistance has steadily 
decreased to € 567.68 million in 2012 from € 1.271 billion in 2001 (Moalla-Fetini et al., 2005: 
65). Some analysts describe this situation as signifying the de-industrialization of Kosovo 
(EU/ESI 2002), consistent with the analogy of the Dutch disease discussed earlier. While 
18 As one international official who was in Pristina in 2001 mentions, ‘the most poignant development in 
Kosovo was the boom economy. You could see from the beginning that a bust would follow’ (Villmoare, 
2004: 34). 
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international donor assistance for Kosovo has gradually decreased, from 45 per cent of Kosovo’s 
general government revenues in 2004 to 27 per cent in 2010 (Republic of Kosovo, 2011: 6), 
remittances have been a more constant source of external financing, ranging between 11 and 16 
per cent of GDP (UNDP, 2012: 20). In the absence of a competitive export sector, the economy is 
still highly reliant upon the inflow of remittances (Korovilas, 2002). 
 
There is a general consensus that the main productive sectors that can feasibly be expanded are 
agriculture and the mining and metals sectors. As James Pettifer (2002: 10) notes, subsistence 
agriculture has always been a cornerstone of Kosovo’s economy, and it is imperative that 
agriculture is revived as soon as possible to restore local food supplies, to help restore some 
elements of social stability, and to reduce Kosovo’s dependence on foreign aid. However, 
Kosovo’s agricultural model, attuned to the needs of subsistence agriculture of the extended 
family, conflicts with the neoliberal model which is attuned to the free market and promoted by 
international actors such as the European Union.19 The same could be said of the unsatisfactory 
performance of Kosovo’s mining and metals sector, which is largely the consequence of the 
dominance of the neo-liberal policy paradigm promoted by international actors (Uberti, 2014b). 
Finally, the international architecture set up after 1999 cannot be completely detached from 
Kosovo’s socio-economic system, deeply marked by the extractive industry since 1945 and the 
rent-seeking behaviour attached to it (Pettifer, 2002; Uberti, 2014a).  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Drawing on insights from the economics and political economy of rentier theory, this article has 
highlighted certain structural limitations of contemporary statebuilding operations by focusing on 
UNMIK in Kosovo. Understanding the interplay between economic and political reconstruction 
appears key in the context of Kosovo. In the absence of clear improvements in living standards 
and given the fact that UNMIK was in charge of Kosovo, the population logically attributed all 
setbacks to the UN administration. This article developed this theme by taking a fresh look at 
19 As a World Bank study argued, ‘in the long run it will be non-agricultural job creation which will 
determine economic development in the rural areas of Kosovo’ (1999: 2). 
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Kosovo’s economic growth data, with a specific focus on the socio-economic shortcomings that 
hindered Kosovo’s development in the post-war years. The post-conflict statebuilding project in 
Kosovo is inspired by the liberal peace paradigm, but this model as a modus operandi for 
statebuilding is not without its internal contradictions. Rentier statebuilding is one of these 
contradictions, where the end result is a state less accountable to its people, and less interested in 
or able to develop an internationally competitive productive base. The former phenomenon refers 
to the political economy aspect of rentierism, while the latter aspect pertains to an economic 
malaise (the Dutch disease) where the relative abundance of non-produced income from external 
flows crowds out production in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, as well as agricultural 
and manufactured goods exports.  
 
In the case of Kosovo, the combined contribution of resource rents, aid and worker remittances 
from abroad has amounted to a third of national income. In the past, Kosovo has been able to 
extract a substantial geopolitical rent in the form of aid. Although the proportion of non-produced 
income is still very high, in recent years most of this is attributable to remittances received from 
Kosovars living abroad. However, Kosovo is not a classic oil-dependent rentier economy either, 
and aid flows are diminishing. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Kosovar state has not 
failed to harness resources through tax revenues. As indicated above, its domestic tax base is not 
insignificant, although heavily reliant on trade taxes, which will certainly diminish as the 
economy becomes more integrated via trade agreements with the rest of Europe.  
 
Critics of aid (Easterly, 2006: 30; Ghani and Lockhart, 2008; Moyo, 2009; Surkhe et al., 2005) 
factor in many externalities — positive and negative — associated with international involvement 
in peacebuilding. Their view is that, on balance, aid does harm as solutions are imposed from the 
outside, are not sui generis, and can even retard statebuilding buttressed by domestic resources. 
In this regard, our aim is not to belittle the achievements of the international community in 
Kosovo (which are numerous), but rather to shed light on the oft-neglected theme of negative 
externalities of international interventions, which can take the form of rentier statebuilding in 
specific instances. The scholars who include aspects of political economy in their research focus 
generally on the need to design inclusive socio-economic policies to create the conditions for 
sustainable development in individual societies, without giving as much importance to possible 
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negative externalities of international interventions on the local economy (Uberti et al., 2014). At 
the same time, traditional development economics (see, for instance, Sachs, 2005) has long 
considered foreign aid as a tool to ‘tackle multiple socioeconomic pathologies quickly and 
simultaneously’ (Abuzeid, 2009: 17), overlooking the potentially deleterious effects on the 
governments of the receiving countries. In that respect, rentier theory brings an additional level of 
complexity to the field of statebuilding and peacebuilding, as it underscores that ‘it matters 
whether a state relies on taxes from extractive industries, agricultural production, foreign aid, 
remittances, or international borrowing because these different sources of revenues … have a 
powerful (and quite different) impact on the state’s institutional development’ (Karl, 1997: 34).  
 
Hence, it seems impossible — or implausible — to conceptually separate institution-building 
from its social moorings (Lemay-Hébert, 2009a). Critics of the liberal model are not confined to 
those who emphasize the negative impact of aid, or those who believe in giving war a chance 
following Tilly (1992; Luttwak, 1999), but also involve scholars who suggest a thorough re-
examination of this model and of the alternative frameworks of peace. In this regard, we agree 
with Michael Pugh (2005: 33) that there is a distinct need to re-politicize economic issues in 
peacebuilding contexts. It is our hope that this study will contribute to the broader research 
agenda on the interplay between economic development and political settlement in peacebuilding 
contexts, which has started to attract more attention in the last few years.20  
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